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Tradable Standards for Clean Air Act Carbon Policy 
Dallas Burtraw, Art Fraas, and Nathan Richardson 
Abstract 
EPA is in the process of regulating U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions using its powers under 
the Clean Air Act. The likely next phase of this regulatory program is performance standards under 
Section 111 of the act for coal plants and petroleum refineries, which the agency has committed to 
finalize by the end of 2012. Section 111 appears to allow use of flexible, market-based regulatory tools. In 
this paper, we discuss one such tool, tradable standards. Tradable standards appear to be a legally and 
politically viable choice for the agency, and evidence suggests they are substantially more cost-effective 
than traditional performance standards. The paper discusses implementation issues with tradable 
standards, including categorization, banking, and phased implementation, as well as broader issues with 
the Section 111 rulemaking process as it relates to state-level GHG regulatory efforts. 
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Tradable Standards for Clean Air Act Carbon Policy 
Dallas Burtraw, Art Fraas, and Nathan Richardson∗ 
1. Introduction 
For the near and foreseeable future, climate policy in the United States is in the hands of 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states. EPA has committed to issuing what 
will be the first nationwide regulations on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from existing 
sources, initially applying to the largest categories of emitters: fossil-fuel steam power plants and 
oil refineries. The relevant part of the Clean Air Act (CAA), Section 111, provides the agency 
with the necessary authority, carves out a specific planning and implementation function for the 
states, and allows significant flexibility. Not only is this the first instance of GHG regulation of 
existing stationary sources, but key parts of Section 111 have been rarely used and potentially 
support a variety of options for the design of the regulation. The agency therefore has the 
opportunity (and the burden) of making a series of important choices about the nature of its 
program for regulation of GHGs at these sources. 
The most fundamental of these choices is the regulatory approach the agency will use. 
Section 111 requires the use of “performance standards.” Traditionally, this has meant one-size-
fits-all standards for each sector or “source category” being regulated. But the statute does not 
require such rigid standards, at least with respect to regulation of existing sources, and the 
agency has argued that it may implement market-based emissions control programs under the 
section—a reading with which most legal analysts appear to agree (Wannier et al. 2011). (EPA 
made similar arguments in 2008 and 2005; see EPA 2008a at 44490, 2005).  
One such market-based approach is cap-and-trade, which has been used under several 
previous CAA programs and was considered by Congress in 2009 for greenhouse gases. 
However, in the context of recent legislative efforts to address GHG emissions, the cap-and-trade 
approach has come to be seen by parts of the polity as “growth-limiting.” But even if EPA 
eschews cap and trade, it need not forgo flexible, market-based tools entirely and resort to 
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traditional inflexible standards. We describe an approach that can incorporate trading and most 
of its associated efficiency benefits while avoiding some, and perhaps all, of the political and 
practical drawbacks of cap-and-trade.  
This alternative approach is a tradable standard. Put most simply, under a tradable 
standard the agency sets a performance standard, but allows emitters to trade so that it is 
achieved on a sector-wide, rather than individual, basis. Tradable standards are almost certainly 
legal, are both administratively and politically viable, and are relatively cost-effective—certainly 
more so than traditional standards, and perhaps approaching or exceeding the cost-effectiveness 
of cap-and trade depending on how either were to take shape. Also, tradable standards are not 
new, having been used by EPA in limited fashion as early as the 1980s, most prominently to 
implement the phaseout of lead in gasoline (Nichols 1997; Newell and Rogers 2003). But they 
are not a widely used or widely understood policy option. The primary aims of this paper are to 
explain this policy tool in theory and to describe the decisions EPA would have to make to put 
this tool into practice for GHG regulation. 
The agency faces at least two other key decisions in implementing carbon regulations for 
existing sources. One is that EPA must decide how much to leave to the states. The agency could 
design a complete program for states to implement—a model rule—or it could leave basic 
program design to the states. Either way, states will play an important role. But a model rule 
would provide a path of least resistance for cash-strapped states and would likely be widely 
adopted. Since we envision a tradable standard as an interstate scheme, the implications of this 
delegation decision are relevant, and we discuss them in some detail in Section 5. 
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, the agency will have to decide how stringent its 
Section 111 carbon regulations should be. We do not directly address that issue here except to 
highlight that stringency is related to flexibility since Section 111 requires the consideration of 
cost.  By lowering cost, flexibility would afford and enable greater emissions reduction than 
would a traditional (inflexible) standard. 
2. EPA, Carbon, and the Clean Air Act 
The CAA has only recently emerged as a tool for regulating greenhouse gases. The 
Supreme Court’s 2007 Massachusetts v. EPA ruling (549 U.S. 497 at 528–529, 2007) clarified 
that the existing CAA gives the agency the authority to regulate GHG emissions. Since 2009, 
EPA has made a formal science-based “endangerment finding” for GHGs and used its CAA 
authority to begin regulation of carbon emissions from a variety of sources. These regulations Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Fraas, and Richardson 
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include fleet standards for new road vehicles and preconstruction permits for new and modified 
stationary sources (primarily power plants and industrial facilities).  
In late 2010, the agency committed to carbon regulations for the operation of both new 
and existing emitters in the sectors with the largest emissions: fossil-fuel steam power generation 
(mostly coal) and petroleum refining. These regulations are required under the terms of a pair of 
settlement agreements between EPA and states and environmental groups that had sued the 
agency seeking GHG performance standards.
1 The standards, under Section 111 of the act, will 
be the first national carbon regulations for existing emitters. Under the agreement, the agency 
was to propose the standards in 2011 (though this has been repeatedly delayed) and finalize them 
by the end of 2012.
2  
2.1 Section 111 Performance Standards: New and Existing Sources 
When EPA does issue the promised standards, the process will unfold as follows. Under 
Section 111 of the act, EPA is charged with setting “performance standards” that will apply to 
new sources in defined “source categories” (see CAA § 111(b)). Sources cannot be operated 
unless they meet these standards (CAA § 111(e)). The agency currently has such new source 
performance standards (NSPS) for a wide variety of sources, covering a wide variety of 
pollutants (though not GHGs). 
But Section 111 also provides for the regulation of existing sources via performance 
standards (CAA § 111(d)). Only specific pollutants can be subject to such existing source 
performance standards (ESPS): that is, those not regulated under other parts of the statute, such 
as programs for “criteria” or hazardous pollutants. In the past, almost no pollutants have fallen 
into this category, so the agency has issued only a few ESPS. But GHGs at existing sources are 
not regulated elsewhere under the act, and are therefore subject to ESPS.  
ESPS, unlike NSPS, require states to play a major regulatory role. Under ESPS, states 
propose the standards, EPA decides whether to approve them, and states implement them. The 
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statute explicitly analogizes the process to the State Implementation Plan (SIP) process for 
regulating conventional “criteria” pollutants such as nitrogen oxides and particulates under a 
different part of the CAA (CAA § 111(d)). The only substantive requirement Section 111 
imposes on the states is that they must regulate using performance standards, as defined in the 
statute. 
The statute appears to give states the initiative in the ESPS process, but since EPA must 
ultimately approve or disapprove state plans, under the agency’s interpretation it must first issue 
guidelines to the states (see EPA 2011, 2). How detailed these guidelines will be is an important 
decision for the agency. They could come in almost any form, from a methodology for the states 
to apply in their planning process, to a simple emissions rate performance target, to a fully 
specified model rule for a trading program. Analogous examples of each approach can be found 
in the development of various SIPs for regulating conventional pollutants.  
2.2 Performance Standards and Flexibility 
Performance standards have traditionally meant a uniform source-category-wide 
standard, based on a technological assessment, which must be met by each source subject to the 
standard.
3 But both EPA and independent legal analysts have argued that the act does not require 
such a rigid approach for existing sources. 
The statute defines performance standards as regulations that reflect the “best system of 
emission reduction” taking cost into consideration (CAA § 111(a)). EPA and legal analysts argue 
that this allows the use of market-based, flexible compliance mechanisms, since the agency 
could identify such tools as the “best system.”
4 
In principle, Section 111 appears to be sufficiently flexible for EPA to implement a cap-
and-trade system. Indeed, EPA attempted to do this in 2005 for mercury emissions from coal 
plants (see EPA 2005, 28606), though that rule was rejected by courts for unrelated reasons. 
Nevertheless, cap-and-trade is politically controversial, and opponents of environmental 
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trade among facilities. 
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regulation would undoubtedly criticize an EPA decision to implement a policy recently rejected 
by Congress. At least one high-ranking EPA official has explicitly promised that the agency will 
not consider cap-and-trade (see Nelson 2011). Therefore, whatever the advantages of cap-and-
trade as a policy tool may be, we do not consider it here.  
The policy tool we describe, tradable standards, has some similarities with cap-and-
trade—most obviously, the ability to trade credits. But tradable standards differ from cap-and-
trade in important ways that reduce their associated administrative complexity and political 
controversy. First, they have much more in common with traditional performance standards that 
EPA has frequently used in the past under Section 111, likely reducing legal risk and certainly 
making states and EPA more comfortable with administering the program. They also require no 
emissions cap, likely reducing political criticism. Finally, they do not require EPA to administer 
the complex and controversial process of allocating emissions allowances.
5  
3. Fundamentals of Tradable Standards 
Tradable standards combine elements of traditional performance standards with markets. 
Just as under traditional regulation, tradable standards require the regulator to set a performance 
standard for sources in the sector being regulated. But instead of requiring each source to meet 
the standard independently, sources that do not meet the standard can purchase credits from 
those that outperform it, such that the standard is achieved on average across the regulated 
sector.  
3.1 Tradable Standards for the Electricity Sector 
Fossil-fuel electricity generation is an especially important example because it has the 
largest emissions of any sector to be regulated by EPA. A tradable standard in the electricity 
sector would work as follows. First, the agency would set a standard limiting the average heat 
rate (energy input per unit of electricity output) or emissions rate (emissions per unit of 
electricity output) of regulated electricity generating units (EGUs) to a specified benchmark. 
EGUs that have a lower heat rate or lower emissions rate would earn credits that could be traded 
to other facilities, or potentially banked for later use. A unit that does not meet the performance 
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may seek to secure advantage through subcategorization (which we discuss below), or by limiting or expanding the 
scope of trading. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Fraas, and Richardson 
6 
standard could comply either through upgrades or through the purchase of credits from other 
regulated EGUs.  
Figure 1 illustrates trading between two facilities to achieve compliance with an 
emissions rate standard set at 1,980 lbs/MWh, which would represent a reduction of about 5 
percent from the average for coal steam boilers. Plant A, with an emissions rate of 1,880 would 
earn a credit of 100 lbs for every MWh it generates. It might sell the credit to Plant B, with an 
emissions rate of 2,080 lbs/MWh. Assuming the EGUs generate the same total kWh, this trade 
allows both to meet the standard. Plant B could also make upgrades to meet the standard rather 
than trading, and Plant A could make its own upgrades so as to have more credits to sell. What 
decision each plant makes depends on its upgrade costs and the market price of credits. 
 
Figure 1. Credit Trading to Achieve Compliance with a Performance Standard 
 
 
Formally, under a tradable standard, credits are earned for electricity production at the 
benchmark rate, and credits are surrendered at the facility’s actual rate. The units on these credits 
are either Btu (in the case of a heat rate standard) or pounds of CO2 (in the case of an emissions 
rate standard). Hence, one can envision a tradable standard as two instruments in one policy. In 
the first, it imposes an opportunity cost on a facility’s heat rate or emissions rate, providing a 
continuous incentive for improvement. In the second, it provides an output subsidy equivalent to 
the value of credits earned at the benchmark performance standard for each unit of electricity 
generation.  
The simplest and probably most legally defensible program design begins with EPA’s 
past practice of setting a performance standard based on a technology assessment. In the 
electricity sector, EPA would establish a performance standard on the basis of a technology Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Fraas, and Richardson 
7 
assessment for each category (or subcategory) of electricity generation technology (e.g., coal-
fired boiler, fluidized bed combustor, oil-fired boiler, etc.).
6  
3.2 Economic and Environmental Benefits of Tradable Standards 
Once EPA has set the standard in this way, allowing trading only makes sense if it has 
identifiable benefits. There is evidence that incorporating flexibility into ESPS for coal-fired 
power plants could greatly increase the cost-effectiveness of regulation, and possibly the 
environmental benefits depending on how the cost savings are used.  
The reason flexibility reduces cost is the underlying heterogeneity in the energy 
efficiency (heat rate) of the U.S. coal fleet. This is illustrated in Figure 2, which displays the heat 
rate of EGUs along the horizontal axis and the heat input at each unit on the vertical axis. More 
efficient units are toward the left, and more heavily utilized units are toward the top. Although 
many factors help explain the diversity in the operating efficiency of units, engineering case 
studies (Sargent & Lundy 2009; DiPietro and Krulla 2010; NETL 2010) and statistical analysis 
(Linn et al. 2011) suggest that opportunities for efficiency improvements are available.   
There is substantial evidence that market-based approaches in general and tradable 
standards in particular can help identify the least-cost opportunities for efficiency improvements 
and thereby reduce the costs of GHG regulation. For example, Burtraw et al. (2011) find that a 
tradable standard for fossil EGUs would result in a 60 percent smaller increase in retail 
electricity prices and a two-thirds reduction in overall costs compared to a traditional (inflexible) 
performance standard. 
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Tradable standards would also provide incentives for discovery of new improvements in 
energy efficiency and reductions in GHG emissions. In addition, the market associated with a 
tradable standard would yield important information on the costs and effectiveness of the 
program.
7  
Because cost is an explicit consideration in setting standards under Section 111, the cost 
savings from using tradable standards could lead to greater overall emissions reductions. EPA 
has reported that it would be reasonable to expect emissions reductions of 2 to 5 percent for 
individual plants (and up to 10 percent for a few plants) without major changes in plant 
utilization (EPA 2008b).  If EPA follows precedent, it would base standards on an assessment of 
broad applicability and cost under its traditional standard-setting approach. In that case, a 
reasonable expectation for the average fleet-wide heat-rate reduction based on a plant-by-plant 
standard would be near the lower end of the range, at about 2 percent.  
                                                 
7 It is important to note, however, that the price of a credit does not translate directly to a value for the cost per ton 
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to the social cost of carbon (Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon 2010). The credit price is 
influenced by the fact that credits are earned by generating electricity (at the benchmark performance standard), 
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But under a tradable standard approach, EPA could set a standard that reflects the 
heterogeneity and potential efficiency gains across the fleet of coal-fired power plants. Thus, 
EPA could adopt a standard based on an expected reduction in heat rate closer to 5 percent and 
justify it based on the opportunity and incentives of a trading program to make cost-effective 
improvements in the efficiency of coal-fired plants. 
4. Design Choices for Tradable Standards 
Although tradable standards are not fundamentally complex policies, EPA and/or the 
states nevertheless would face a series of important design considerations, just as with any 
regulatory policy. 
4.1 Setting the Standard 
As noted above, there are two basic approaches in the design of a performance standard, 
whether tradable or not, for GHG emissions from EGUs. An energy-efficiency-based 
performance standard would be set as heat input per unit of electricity generated, i.e. the heat 
rate (Btu per kWh). Alternatively, an emissions rate performance standard would be set as CO2 
emissions per unit of generation (pounds of CO2 emissions per kWh).
8  
One distinction that favors a heat rate standard is that the identification of an efficiency 
target might appeal broadly in political terms even among those who are unconvinced of the 
threat of climate change. On the other hand, an emissions rate standard specifically identifies the 
focus of regulatory interest—emissions. In addition, it provides a slightly broader set of 
compliance opportunities because electricity generating units can achieve small reductions in 
emissions by changing the type of coal they use. 
4.2 Geographic Scope 
The cost advantage from compliance flexibility stems from the heterogeneity of regulated 
sources; savings accrue by enabling emissions reduction activities to occur where they are least 
expensive, avoiding changes that are more expensive. In any market-based emissions control 
program, trading across as broad a group of sources as possible is desirable because it would 
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encompass more heterogeneity and provide more opportunities for emissions reductions and cost 
savings. 
Perhaps the most obvious implication of this is that programs that cover a larger 
geographic area are expected to have a lower average cost per unit of emissions reduction and 
less price volatility than smaller programs. This means that an interstate tradable standard is 
preferable, and a nationwide standard is ideal from a cost-effectiveness perspective. To the 
extent that interstate coordination is easier if EPA provides more direction, the benefits of greater 
geographic scope point in favor of EPA taking a larger role. 
Uniform national regulations would also reduce transaction costs and uncertainty across 
an interstate trading program. Such consistency provides an accurate, certain, and consistent 
quantification of the performance of each source and assures the integrity of the credits traded in 
the market. Consistency across states also makes it easier for EPA to administer the program. 
4.3 Identifying Source Categories/Subcategories 
In prior implementation of regulations under Section 111, EPA has traditionally 
established categories and/or subcategories of emissions sources that are technologically similar 
with identifiable control technologies. Using this approach, EPA would establish performance 
standards for the identified categories or subcategories that are consistent with its judgment of 
the overall degree of emissions reduction that could be achieved by the source category—e.g., 
coal-fired boilers or fossil-fuel-fired electric generating units. As noted above, the statute 
requires EPA to use source categories as the basis for its Section 111 performance standards, but 
the agency retains discretion over whether and how to define the boundaries of these categories 
(CAA § 111(b); see also EPA 2011, 2–3). 
The strongest case for creating different categories arises where there are significant 
differences in technology and performance. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of heat rates at 
various facilities, sorted by boiler technology. Among coal technologies, fluidized bed 
combustors involve a different combustion technology and appear to be significantly different in 
terms of performance.  Hence, EPA might reasonably create a category for fluidized bed 
combustors that is separate from other coal-fired EGU boilers.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Fraas, and Richardson 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Heat Rates by Boiler Technology 
 
There appears to be no statutory restriction prohibiting EPA from enabling a standard that 
bridges multiple source categories (see Richardson 2011, 17–18; Wannier et al. 2011, 6–7).
 
Doing so would broaden the scope of the program just as interstate trading or banking would. 
The most cost-effective program design would allow trading across many source categories. 
Another important issue, from the perspective of achieving cost-effectiveness, is the 
definition of the benchmark that determines the rate at which credits are earned in each source 
category or subcategory. Units with heat rates or emissions rates below the benchmark will 
emerge as winners under the program relative to units with rates above the benchmark. Owners 
of units that have relatively higher rates will have an economic interest in creating multiple 
benchmarks that might be implemented as different subcategories or different benchmarks within 
a category.  
In general, the greater the number of benchmarks, the closer each unit will be to its 
benchmark, which will limit the total magnitude of credit transfers among units. With a 
proliferation of benchmarks, EGUs earn credits at their idiosyncratic benchmark rate rather than 
the average rate for the source category. This has the effect of providing a smaller incentive to 
expand output at relatively efficient units because they earn credits at a lower rate than if there Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Fraas, and Richardson 
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were a single benchmark. Conversely, less efficient units have a greater incentive to maintain 
output because they earn credits at a greater rate. This means that to achieve the same level of 
emissions reductions with a greater number of subcategories, a more stringent average standard 
would be required. 
The overall result is that the proliferation of benchmarks is likely to raise program costs 
even as it reduces the financial transfers among units. Consequently, a tradable standard with the 
smallest possible number of benchmarks within the trading group is expected to be more cost-
effective. 
4.4 Biomass Co-firing 
Biomass co-firing at conventional coal-fired boilers may provide further opportunities 
beyond efficiency improvements for emissions reductions.
9 The amount of biomass that can be 
co-fired varies with boiler type, but can be as much as 10 percent of the heat input at a plant. If 
one considers the combustion of waste biomass to be roughly CO2 neutral, the substitution of 
biomass for coal will reduce GHG emissions for these plants. EPA has suggested that co-firing 
with biomass could replace 2 to 5 percent of current coal use (EPA 2008b).  
However, because biomass availability and the boiler characteristics vary by region, EPA 
could not adopt a traditional Section 111 standard requiring co-firing of biomass at each facility, 
since many facilities would be unable to comply (or unable to comply at reasonable cost). With 
trading across the sector, a market-based program such as a tradable standard could consider the 
potential GHG emissions reductions from co-firing biomass.
10 Emitters with access to biomass 
fuels could use them, thereby overcomplying with the standard and generating credits that could 
be used elsewhere. 
4.5 Banking and Bad Years 
Allowing the banking of credits increases the efficiency of an emissions trading program 
by allowing sources to shift reductions to lower-cost time periods, smoothing price variations 
                                                 
9 Depending, of course, on one’s views about the life-cycle emissions of the biomass fuel being used. However, co-
firing of biomass is likely to involve waste biomass almost exclusively, with little or no use of closed-loop dedicated 
biomass fuel supply, avoiding most of the issues associated with life-cycle biomass emissions. 
10 Richardson 2011, 31–34, suggests that treating emissions from biomass cofiring differently from coal emissions 
is probably, but not necessarily, legally compatible with CAA § 111. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Fraas, and Richardson 
13 
among different vintages of credits and increasing the cost-effectiveness of the program.  
Banking also encourages early reductions in emissions.  
Moreover, the utility sector could be vulnerable to a bad year created by a combination of 
events—a hot summer, a Katrina-like storm, the outage of a nuclear plant—that might require a 
greater utilization of the coal-fired capacity in the fleet than anticipated in EPA’s development of 
the standard. Less efficient units are typically less utilized and may see a relatively greater 
increase in utilization in such a year, which would put strains on the GHG regulatory program 
and on the electric utility sector.
11  A banking program could address this potential problem by 
providing a “safety valve” to address such contingencies. Banking allows EGUs to set aside 
credits for use to address unusual or unanticipated situations such as extreme weather events or 
the loss of significant generation capacity due to the shutdown of other facilities.  
4.6 Continuing Improvement 
While a tradable standard provides EGUs with an incentive to adopt cost-effective 
measures to meet the standard, a set standard provides a weak incentive for ongoing 
improvements in industry-wide heat rate or reductions in emissions rate. The standard could be 
tightened in the future, but since it is unclear when or whether this will happen, it is a source of 
uncertainty.  
An explicit commitment to specified, evolving future targets would mitigate these issues. 
To be sure, such a phased standard could be changed just as easily as a static one, but this is 
probably less likely. A phased program could start earlier in order to capture the low cost 
opportunities and as a way to provide rewards for early action. . In fact elsewhere under the 
Clean Air Act, EPA has interpreted phased implementation to allow voluntary early adoption of 
measures more stringent than currently required to qualify for delayed compliance with of 
subsequently required measures.
12 More directly, by coupling phased reduction targets for future 
years coupled with the opportunity for credit banking, EGUs would likely pursue a glide path of 
reductions that would improve the cost-effectiveness of the program.  
                                                 
11 One observation about this scenario is that relatively higher heat rates or emissions rates are explained in part by 
lower utilization. Hence, other things being equal, the increased utilization of units will improve their operating 
performance. However, this is not likely to be sufficient to address the industry concern. 
12 These provisions were part of the implementation of the NOx program under Title IV. See 40 C.F.R. § 76.8 
(2012). Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Fraas, and Richardson 
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Moreover, a phased program could drive further improvements in the energy efficiency 
of EGUs. EPA has interpreted Section 111 as allowing phased standards. In setting standards, 
EPA may “look toward what may fairly be projected for the regulated future, rather than the 
state-of-the-art present” (EPA 2005, 28620).
13 
5. Interaction with the States 
Whatever policy tool EPA chooses for its GHG performance standards, it will not be 
working on a blank slate. Many states have existing or planned GHG regulatory programs, and 
California and the northeastern states in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative have cap-and-
trade programs in place. Moreover, as noted above, states will play an important role in 
implementing and perhaps designing ESPS regulations, whether they have their own existing 
programs or not. For these reasons, EPA decisions about states’ role in the regulatory program 
will be critical. 
5.1 Top-Down or Bottom-Up? 
EPA’s typical practice in setting up a trading program has been to issue a detailed model 
rule for adoption in State Implementation Plans (SIPs) (see EPA 2011, 2). In addition, EPA has 
provided the resources to administer the market for those states adopting the model rule. This 
approach reduces the burden on the states in developing a plan and obtaining EPA approval, and 
providing the resources necessary to administer a trading market.
14 The adoption of a model rule 
further assures state-by-state consistency in trading requirements, reducing transaction costs and 
uncertainty across an interstate trading program and providing a consistent quantification of the 
                                                 
13 In its Clean Air Mercury Rule, for example, EPA adopted emissions caps in 2010 based on specified 
technologies, and a significantly more stringent emissions cap in 2018 based on other control technologies that were 
adequately demonstrated, but were not considered to be available for commercial application by the earlier 2010 
date. In legal terms, the agency interpreted the “best system of emission reduction” to mean not only a trading 
system, but one with increased stringency over time, based on technology and costs. EPA’s position has support in 
the relevant case law. See Portland Cement v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 391 (DC Circuit 1973) (holding that 
“Section 111 looks toward what may fairly be projected for the regulated future, rather than the state of the art at 
present”; though note that this holding is in reference only to the new source provisions of Section 111). See also 
Lignite Energy Council v. EPA, 198 F.3d 930, 932 (DC Circuit 1999) (holding that “EPA's choice[s under Section 
111] will be sustained unless the environmental or economic costs of using the technology are exorbitant”). 
14 States may adopt the model rule—a fully approvable control strategy satisfying all the requirements of the Section 
111 SIP process—either by incorporating the model rule by reference or directly codifying the provisions of the 
model rule in its SIP.  Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Fraas, and Richardson 
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performance of each source. This consistency assures the integrity of the allowances traded in 
the market and makes it easier for EPA to administer the program. 
In past model rules involving cap-and-trade, EPA has provided states with the flexibility 
to adopt their own approaches to the allocation of allowances, a process that we have noted 
would not be required under a tradable standard. However, the assignment of economic value 
associated with all sorts of environmental permitting has traditionally been state prerogative, and 
it might be left up to states to determine benchmarks for subcategories within their state to 
address specific distributional issues or other goals. If states are allowed to adopt their own 
benchmarks, EPA might be justified in requiring those states to demonstrate that equivalent or 
greater emissions reductions would be achieved relative to the model rule benchmarks (ignoring 
interstate trading).  
As we also have noted, adding subcategories and corresponding benchmarks could 
reduce aggregate cost-effectiveness. Requiring a demonstration of equivalency would help 
remedy the concern that one state could take an action that imposed greater emissions reductions 
and raised costs for another state. It would raise costs overall, but the additional costs would 
largely be imposed within the state choosing to deviate from EPA’s benchmarks.
15 
5.2 States with Their Own GHG Programs 
States with existing GHG regulatory programs will undoubtedly seek to establish 
“equivalency” with whatever form of Section 111 performance standards EPA issues, so that the 
measures that in-state sources take to comply with the state programs also count toward federal 
compliance. EPA must decide, based on the statute, what equivalency means.  
One option is to require the state to show that within its program the sources covered by 
EPA’s standard will achieve equal or greater performance.
16 Where state programs include a 
variety of different sources, or allow interstate trading, it may be difficult to make this showing. 
                                                 
15 In addition, of course, states may adopt their own program outside of EPA’s model rule. However, states 
choosing to do so must develop a SIP and obtain EPA approval of the SIP by demonstrating that it is equivalent in 
achieving the environmental goals of the EPA model program. Under current EPA regulations, states are required to 
include emissions standards in their plans—that is, standards based on an allowance system that caps emissions or 
that prescribes allowable rates of emissions (see 40 C.F.R. 60.24). 
16 Interpreted as increase in efficiency (if EPA establishes a heat-rate standard) or reduction in the rate of GHG 
emissions (if EPA’s program is denominated in GHG emissions per kWh). Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Fraas, and Richardson 
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EPA would have to interpret the program in terms of emissions reductions rather than a more 
narrow emissions rate average for this to be viable. 
Another way for EPA to accommodate a variety of state-level programs would be to 
allow the conversion of a rate-based (efficiency) standard to a mass-based (emissions) measure, 
and to provide guidance for how that conversion should be conducted. As noted above, this 
approach could enable states to claim credit for emissions reductions from a variety of alternative 
programs including efficiency programs or regional cap-and-trade. 
If a nationwide EPA trading program were superimposed on existing state regulations 
that are more stringent than EPA’s national program, this could pose a problem for the state 
program. In this case, emitters that comply with the state program will overcomply with the 
national program. If these emitters then use their overcompliance to generate credits to be traded 
into the national program, the net result of the state program will simply be to export its 
emissions, leaving national emissions unaffected, and likely impose upon itself higher local costs 
(see Goulder and Stavins 2011).  
However, states could probably avoid this problem relatively easily. Most obviously, a 
state with its own trading system could opt out of the national trading market. This would likely 
raise costs for other states by denying them credits from the proactive state, assuming that state is 
also a potential provider of low-cost allowances.
17  
6. Conclusion 
EPA faces a series of choices as it decides on its approach for regulating stationary-
source GHG emissions. It must decide whether to incorporate flexibility, what role to leave to 
states, and how stringently to regulate—in addition to myriad technical and procedural issues.  
Adopting a tradable standard, in a phased fashion and through a model rule, could 
balance competing interests and create a comprehensive, cost-effective regulatory program 
(given that the agency has eschewed cap-and-trade). Tradable standards are fundamentally 
flexible, and evidence suggests that they would lead to very large cost savings over inflexible, 
traditional standards. Politically, tradable standards cannot be characterized as a cap-and-trade 
                                                 
17 We note that it is common practice of states to provide incentives (and disincentives) through taxes and tax relief, 
training programs, etc. to attract or discourage economic activity within their states (Shobe and Burtraw 2012). Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Fraas, and Richardson 
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approach because they do not establish a cap.  The important role for states may also shield EPA 
from some political criticism. 
Tradable standards do come with some risks. Litigation over any approach is assured, and 
there is some possibility a court would reject tradable standards as incompatible with the CAA, 
though this appears unlikely. Tradable standards are fundamentally transparent and simple. 
However, adaptations to address environmental or distributional objectives run the risk of 
introducing complexity into the program design that could erode some of the virtues of a market-
based approach. Balancing these considerations will be an important element of EPA’s decisions. 
Other EPA decisions on related issues also will be important, but good options are 
available. A phased approach reduces uncertainty for industry while enshrining improved 
environmental performance in the program from the start. Allowing banking of credits mitigates 
problems arising from unforeseen events. And a model rule reduces the burden on state 
regulators, making an interstate trading program more viable, while leaving states the freedom to 
take a different course if needed. 
In sum, tradable standards have been successful in the past, are broadly consistent with 
both the statute and agency practices, and appear to be much more cost-effective than traditional 
performance standards. These advantages make them a compelling option for the agency. Resources for the Future  Burtraw, Fraas, and Richardson 
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